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A Novel Approach to Independent Taxi 
Scheduling Problem Based on Stable 
Matching 
Abstract This paper describes a taxi scheduling system, which aims to improve the overall 
efficiency of the system, both from the perspective of the drivers and the customers. This is of 
particular relevance to Chinese cities, where hailing a taxi on the street is by far the most 
common way in which taxis are requested, since the majority of taxi drivers operate 
independently, rather than working for a company. The mobile phone and GPS-based taxi 
scheduling system, which is described in this paper, aims to provide a decision support system for 
taxi drivers and facilitates direct information exchange between taxi drivers and passengers, 
while allowing drivers to remain independent. The taxi scheduling problem is considered to be a 
non-cooperative game between taxi drivers and a description of this problem is given. We adopt 
an efficient algorithm to discover a Nash equilibrium, such that each taxi driver and passenger 
cannot benefit from changing their assigned partner. Two computational examples are given to 
illustrate the effectiveness of the approach. 
Keywords: taxi scheduling; game theory; stable marriage problem; GPS; street hailing 
1 Introduction 
Taxis play an important role in modern public transportation networks, especially 
in countries such as China and India, where bus and underground train services 
are still under development and do not currently provide the coverage required by 
passengers. Taking a taxi is a convenient way to get to your destination, although 
it is usually slightly more expensive than buses and subways. According to a 2006 
survey, there are approximately one million taxis in service around mainland 
China and the two million people who are involved in the taxi industry generate 
an annual turnover of more than 29.5 billion US dollars (Yearbook of China 2006). 
 
We can broadly classify taxi services into three categories: street hailing, taxi-
stands and prearranged bookings (Li 2006, pp. 25-27). Street hailing is a common 
method for getting a taxi, especially in small cities where taxi services are on a 
relatively small scale. Street hailing is simple and has no requirement for 
expensive equipment or systems. However, as will be analyzed later in this 
section, street hailing causes several problems, including low taxi utilization, long 
passenger waiting times, road safety issues, and traffic congestion. Taxi-stands 
have fewer problems but can only serve a small group of passengers at fixed 
locations, for example, city centers, bus/train stations, airports, etc. Prearranged 
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booking is widely considered to be a more advanced and efficient taxi dispatching 
method, but is impractical when there are many independent taxi drivers. The 
booking can be performed via traditional telephone calls or by utilizing other 
communication technologies (such as websites or text messages). A taxi 
dispatching center is often employed to collect all the passenger information and 
coordinate the taxi dispatching centrally. The dispatching systems often utilize 
GPS devices and wireless communication equipment. The advantage of such a 
pre-booking system is that the demands of passengers are clear and known in 
advance. One drawback is that the system is often expensive and therefore only 
suitable for large taxi companies. In addition, the system relies upon the mutual 
trust between taxi drivers and passengers, in that neither party will break the 
agreed appointment. Unfortunately, in reality, the breaking of appointments 
happens frequently in many countries. 
 
Unlike in Europe and the USA, prearranging bookings is not a popular method for 
hailing taxis in China. Most taxi drivers are self-employed, although they may be 
registered as employees for some taxi companies. It is hard to build a prearranged 
booking mechanism where taxi drivers who are self-employed (or employed by 
many different taxi companies) would work cooperatively. An efficient 
communication network would also be needed to implement this type of taxi 
scheduling, especially in a city with a large population. In China, a very limited 
number of taxi companies provide a prearranged booking service, except in some 
of the larger cities such as Beijing and Shanghai. Therefore, street hailing is still 
the most frequent method of getting a taxi in China and approximately 85% of 
taxi services are operated in this way. However, as mentioned earlier, street 
hailing is inefficient and poses both safety and congestion problems. Taxi drivers 
are unable to predict exactly when and where to meet the next passenger and 
passengers cannot be sure how long they will have to wait for the arrival of a taxi, 
leading to high mileage waste for taxi drivers and longer waiting times for 
passengers. In addition, taxi drivers need to concentrate on both driving and 
finding the next passenger, increasing the risk of accidents. Frequently, too many 
taxis crowd the city centers and passenger hotspots, leading to congestion. 
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There have been several research projects and technological innovations for pre-
arranged booking systems, often abstracted and formulated as Dial-A-Ride  
Problem (DARP), which falls into the broader category of classic Vehicle Routing 
Problems (VRP), or the Traveling Repair Problem (TRP) (Cordeau and Laporte 
2007). Several on-line algorithms have been developed, using linear programming 
(Deng et al. 1992), heuristics (Madsen et al. 2005; Irani et al. 2004; Luo and 
Schonfeld 2007) and meta-heuristics (Nkoane 2009). Global Positioning Systems 
(GPS) and Geographic Information Systems (GIS) have been used by vehicle 
dispatching systems in many cities, to improve the efficiency of their taxi services 
(Liao 2003; Lee et al. 2003; Prakash and Kulkarin 2003; Glaschenko et al. 2009). 
For example, a GPS-based Automatic Vehicle Location and Dispatching System 
greatly improved the quality and efficiency of taxi services in Singapore. Once a 
request for a taxi is received, the control center will send signals to the taxis which 
are located within 10km of the passenger. If one of the drivers accepts the job, 
he/she can respond to the control center by merely pressing a button which is 
installed in his/her taxi. Once the job has been assigned, information about the 
taxi number and expected time of arrival will be immediately sent to the 
passenger (Liao 2003; Lee et al. 2003). 
 
Research and innovation to improve the street hailing method has been very 
limited. The most relevant research, that we are aware of, includes models of the 
taxi market to analyze the demand and supply equilibrium (Cairns and Liston-
Heyes 1996; Flores-Guri 2003), the bilateral searching and meeting between 
passengers and taxis on a road network (Yang et al. 2010b), search friction 
between taxi drivers and passengers (Yang and Yang 2011), and the taxi cruising 
policy, to improve the efficiency of the taxi service (Flores-Guri 2005). However, 
models which consider scheduling algorithms for street hailing are currently 
lacking. Our proposed system is a practical, low cost extension of the street 
hailing system. It helps handle the important problem of search friction, where the 
imperfection of information exchange can reduce the quality of the result and will 
not inhibit independent taxi drivers from strategically positioning themselves 
when they do not currently have passengers. 
The lack of research in this field is probably due to the fact that most taxis that are 
involved in street hailing are self-employed and independent. Unlike in a 
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centralized system, coordination and cooperation between these taxis is difficult, 
or even impossible, without an appropriate mechanism. The systems and 
dispatching methods which are used in the pre-arranged booking method are not 
suitable for street hailing. The independent nature of the taxi drivers using such a 
system cannot be ignored, and perhaps the most important consideration for such 
a system is ensuring that it allocates passengers to taxis so that it is always in the 
best interests of the taxi drivers to keep the passengers that they have been 
allocated to. The focus of this paper is upon a novel system for extending the 
street hailing problem, in order to complement existing systems.  
 
In this paper, the problem of assigning independent taxis to customers is 
considered as a non-cooperative game between taxi drivers. Game theorists have 
developed Nash equilibrium as the theoretical solution to non-cooperative games 
(Nash 1951). If each agent has chosen a strategy and no agent can benefit by 
changing their strategies while the other players keep theirs unchanged, then the 
current set of strategy choices and the corresponding payoffs is a Nash 
equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium in the street hailing problem is a stable matching 
between taxi drivers and passengers such that no taxi driver can be better off by 
changing their chosen passenger. There has previously been some applications of 
equilibrium analysis in logistic and scheduling (Ishii et al. 2012, Kendall and Li 
2013). 
 
In game theory, the Price of Anarchy (PoA) is used to describe the ratio between 
the payoff from an equilibrium and the maximum social payoff (Corbo and Parkes 
2005). PoA can be a criterion in choosing between multiple equilibria. The stable 
matching with the highest PoA is always preferred in taxi scheduling. 
 
In the remaining sections, we first describe the street hailing problem. Section 3 
introduces a novel game theoretic model of street hailing, along with a solution 
methodology for the problem. We then adopt the proposed approach and provide 
two computational examples in Section 4. Section 5 discusses practical 
implementation issues. Conclusions are presented, along with directions for future 
work in section 6. 
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2 Street Hailing Using a New System 
We propose the following system to improve the taxi street hailing process. The 
system adopts the latest GPS, GIS, and 3G/GPRS wireless network. It comprises a 
central server and independent client applications for the passengers and taxis (see 
Figure 1). The server and clients are connected via a 3G/GPRS network. In our 
implementation, the clients are smart phones with GPS and GIS support and 
automatically send location and status (occupied or vacant) information to the 
server via the 3G/GPRS network. The server periodically analyzes the 
geographical distribution of clients on a digital map, generates a stable taxi-
passenger matching (see section 3) and then broadcasts the allocations back to 
clients. 
 
The server  
Communication 
Positioning 
Decision support 
Interface  
Request for 
taxi service 
 Mobile phone 
 
 
Communication 
GPS 
Interface 
 Mobile phone 
 
 
Communicatio
n GPS 
Interface 
Database 
 
Figure 1: Taxi scheduling system 
In practice, there may be several ways to carry out the taxi scheduling under this 
proposed system. A straightforward approach would be to provide passengers and 
taxis with a two-way communication channel to negotiate a manual schedule, 
although this is probably inefficient. An improved design would provide 
automatic decision support for the taxis and passengers by taking full advantage 
of the geographical distribution information of the passengers and taxis on a 
digital map. This paper focuses on the latter implementation and proposes a 
scheduling procedure that is illustrated in Figure 2. As can be seen, the city map is 
divided into smaller zones to facilitate better taxi management and unnecessary 
complexity. A schedule is generated periodically (defined by the parameter tw) 
rather than in real-time. To avoid confusion, the following assumptions are also 
made about the problem under consideration in this paper: 
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1. Taxis are independent and compete against each other in order to gain 
maximum personal return (i.e. there is no subset of taxis that plays a 
cooperative game).  
2. A taxi’s primary goal is to find the next passenger within the shortest possible 
time.   
3. Scheduling recommendations by the system are only supportive, not 
compulsory. Therefore, a taxi can decline a recommendation by the system in 
certain circumstances (e.g. if the recommended passenger is too far away, 
although the division of the city into zones should reduce these occurrences). 
4. Locations of passengers and taxis are automatically retrieved from the 
embedded GPS system and relayed to the server by the client software.   
5. A passenger’s destination information is not known when a schedule is 
generated. Therefore, this system cannot plan a taxi’s route beyond its very 
next service. This means the system is not a pre-booking taxi system but 
serves as an additional system. 
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Figure 2: Scheduling Algorithm 
We note that some of these assumptions may be relaxed or extended in practical 
implementations (see the discussions in Section 5). The main purpose of their 
inclusion in this paper is to introduce a basic problem that can be initially studied 
to gain some insightful knowledge, and which can be extended later. We believe 
that the research results reported in this paper, as well as the new problems 
presented in this paper, would be of interest for other researchers and is worthy of 
future research attention. 
3 A Game Theoretic Model 
In contrast to the previously presented algorithms for the Dial-A-Ride problem, 
we develop a game theoretic model that treats the taxi scheduling problem as a 
Start 
The server divides the city map into smaller zones 
based on requirements 
Vacant taxis repeatedly send location 
and status information to the server. 
Passengers repeatedly send their 
location information to the server 
The server receives information from clients (passengers and taxis), 
updates the database, and then broadcasts, for each zone, the 
information of all the passengers and taxis back to clients.  
Compute a stable passenger-taxi matching and send 
results back to each client. 
Clients accept allocations and send feedback to the server. The 
server updates corresponding database records, and sends updated 
passenger and taxi statuses to clients. 
Unscheduled 
passengers left? 
Wait until the next scheduling window tw 
F 
T 
End 
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non-cooperative game between taxi drivers. The taxi drivers are assumed to be 
self-interested and compete, rather than cooperate, with each other in serving 
passengers. Given the locations of passengers and other taxis, each taxi driver will 
have preferences for some passengers over others and each passenger may also 
have preferences for taxis (e.g. a preference to be picked up as quickly as 
possible). We aim to provide an algorithm to generate a matching of taxis and 
passengers that will be accepted by all taxis and passengers. A matching of taxis 
and passengers is a Nash equilibrium if no taxi or passenger can find a better 
partner than their current one, so that nobody has any incentive to deviate from 
the suggested allocation. Such an allocation would then be appropriate for 
utilization in a system to support street hailing. 
 
Let Ti (i=1,..,n) denote the taxis, Pj (j=1,..,m) the passengers and tij the expected 
time for taxi Ti to reach passenger Pj. Let Eij represent the preference of taxi driver 
Ti for passenger Pj. We consider a computerized street-hailing system in this paper, 
rather than a pre-booking system, and we assume that the taxi drivers are not 
given information about the destination for any passenger. Taxi drivers can, 
therefore, only utilize the tij information for their passenger preferences and will 
prefer passengers which are closer to them. We therefore assume that Eij is 
entirely determined by tij and is negatively correlated with tij. For the experiments 
in this paper, we assume that Eij is defined as follows, in order to meet these 
requirements:  
Eij  = 1/tij   i=1,..,n ; j=1,..,m         (1) 
The ability of taxi A to take a passenger off another taxi B to which it has been 
assigned relies upon both the passenger being willing and taxi A being able to 
reach the passenger before taxi B. We assume that passengers have no preference 
for taxis other than that they wish to be picked up as early as possible, so these 
two factors can be considered to be identical in this case. A passenger’s 
preference, representing the ability of a taxi driver to take this passenger from 
another taxi driver, could then be determined by assuming that the preference of 
passenger Pj for taxi Ti is negatively correlated with tij. Taxi A can then take 
passenger Pj away from another taxi B if and only if tAj < tBj , i.e. if it can reach the 
passenger first. 
 
9 
If we consider the taxi drivers’ preferences (Eij) as the scoring of one partner and 
the aforementioned passenger preference as the scoring of the other partner then 
the taxi-passenger pairing problem can be considered to be a variant of the stable 
marriage problem. The stable marriage problem (Gusfield and Irving 1989; 
Halldorsson et al. 2003) involves n men and n women, each of whom has ranked 
all members of the opposite sex with a unique number between 1 and n, in order 
of preference. The objective is to find a set of man-woman pairs such that there 
are no two people of the opposite sex who would both rather have each other than 
their current partners. The Gale-Shapley algorithm (Gale and Shapley 1962) was 
developed to solve this problem in polynomial time. This algorithm involves a 
number of ‘rounds’. In each round, each unengaged man proposes to the most 
preferred woman to whom he has not yet proposed. Each woman then considers 
all proposals to her and chooses the one she most prefers as her partner and 
becomes engaged to him, potentially ‘trading up’ from an existing engagement. 
This process continues until there is no unengaged man. The Gale-Shapley 
algorithm guarantees a stable matching. 
 
The Gale-Shapley algorithm is still applicable when there are an unequal number 
of partners, i.e. n≠m, so can be applied to the taxi-passenger matching problem. 
The algorithm is either man-oriented or woman-oriented. That is, each man (or 
woman) is paired with the best partner that they can have in any stable matching. 
In the case of n≠m, a stable matching is guaranteed, but some men (or women) 
will not be paired. 
 
For the taxi scheduling problem considered here, given the definition of {Eij} and 
the consequent correlation between the two rankings, the Gale-Shapley algorithm 
can be simplified. We have adopted an algorithm which first sorts all elements in 
the preference matrix {Eij} into decreasing order, then considers each item in turn, 
from the first to the last. For each element Eij, if neither taxi i nor passenger j has 
been allocated then i is allocated to j and (i, j) becomes part of the stable matching. 
The time complexity of the proposed algorithm is O(mn×log(mn)), since sorting is 
the slowest element. It is easy to verify that the stable matching is a Nash 
equilibrium, since the only passengers that a taxi driver could beneficially switch 
to will have been allocated to a taxi which is even closer to them. 
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There must be at least one stable matching (Nash equilibrium), given the 
preference matrix {Eij}, as long as all {Eij} are independent. The proposed 
algorithm will find one such matching. However, even when stable matchings can 
be guaranteed, the algorithm will find only one such matching at a time. When 
there are multiple closest passengers that have the same travel time from a taxi, 
the algorithm has to make a decision about which passenger to allocate the taxi to. 
Different combinations of choices between identical travel times will result in 
different matchings. Therefore, there may exist a large number of stable matches 
for a problem instance which has many taxis with identical travel times to 
passengers. Figure 3a provides an example of such a case for the two-taxi, two-
passenger problem. In this example, taxi T1 can be allocated to either passenger P1 
or P2 and a stable matching will result in either case. However, a lower total cost 
allocation will be when taxi T1 is allocated to passenger P2 than when taxi T1 is 
allocated to passenger P1, due to the different travel times for taxi T2.   
 
Among all taxi-passenger matchings, the matching with the highest PoA (Price of 
Anarchy) can be attractive because it maximizes the social payoff. However, this 
optimal (lowest total cost/waiting time) matching may not be stable. For example, 
consider the two-taxi, two-passenger problem in Figure 3b. In this case, the 
optimal matching is to match taxi T1 with passenger P2 and taxi T2 with passenger 
P1, but this is not a stable matching since taxi T1 could switch to the closer 
passenger P1 and reduce its own cost. Since we consider this to be a non- 
cooperative game, only stable matchings are valid solutions and we only actually 
care about the differences in the PoA between the stable matchings, and 
particularly between the current and optimal stable matchings.  
 
Although finding the  optimal stable matching could be prohibitively difficult, we 
have found that (in our experiments) the differences between the total preference 
values for the stable matchings are actually very small when the number of taxis 
and passengers are large,  as we will show in section 4.1. 
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Fig 3a: Example of a problem with multiple stable matchings. Regardless of which passenger (P1 
or P2) the first taxi (T1) is allocated to, T2 will be allocated to the other passenger and the 
matching will be stable. 
 
Fig 3b: Example of a problem where the optimal social solution is not a stable matching. The 
optimal social solution has taxi T1 servicing passenger P2 and taxi T2 servicing passenger P1, with a 
total time of 4 units. However, this solution is not stable since taxi T1 could switch to passenger 
P1, to the benefit of both passenger and taxi driver. 
4 Computational Examples 
In this section, we simulate the taxi scheduling problem in a square area of 50km 
x 50km. Taxis and passengers are most likely to appear around hotspots such as 
business centers, airports, train stations etc. The locations of taxis and passengers 
are approximately distributed around these hotspots according to the Poisson 
distribution (Bailey and Clark 1987; Li 2006). In our simulations, the distance 
between a taxi and a passenger was determined by the Euclidean distance between 
their locations. Distances were considered to within an accuracy of 0.15km, so 
that two distances were considered to be same if their difference was less than 
0.15km. 
4.1  Optimal stable matching 
In this section we describe the simulation which we carried out to compare the 
stable matching obtained by the simplified Gale-Shapley algorithm to the optimal 
stable matching, which is the stable matching with minimum total pickup distance. 
In the simulation, a taxi scheduling problem with 1,000 taxis and 1,000 
passengers is solved using the simplified Gale-Shapley algorithm described earlier. 
1 2 
2 4 
T1 
 
T2 
 
P1 
 
P2 
 
T1 
 
1 2 
1 3 
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P1 
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The location of taxis and passengers is shown in Figure 4. There are three 
hotspots in this simulated service area. The area is divided into 333 x 333 
subareas, each of which is a 0.15km x 0.15km square. All positions are then 
defined in terms of subareas. The center subarea for each of the three hotspots is 
randomly determined using a uniform random distribution for both the x and y 
coordinates. Taxis and passengers are then randomly allocated to each hotspot 
using a uniform distribution and the subarea position for each taxi and passenger 
is then determined by using Poisson distributions with λ=70, 35, 35 respectively 
to determine the x and y subarea offset from the hotspot it is assigned to. 
 
 
Figure 4: Distribution of 1,000 taxis and 1,000 passengers in a square area (taxis are denoted by x 
marks and passengers are denoted by dots). 
 
The optimal stable matching for 1,000 pairs of taxi and passenger was computed 
by a brute-force search in our implementation and the distances between the taxis 
and the passengers are shown in Figure 5(a), ordered from smallest to largest. The 
smallest distance is zero and the largest distance is 64.9km. Figure 5(b) shows the 
number of taxis which fall into different distance ranges. It shows that most of the 
scheduled taxis travel only short distances to their passengers, while a small 
number of taxis need to travel long distances (more than 14km). The 
computational time required for the best stable matching depends upon how many 
equilibria (stable matchings) a scheduling problem has. In the best case, the time 
complexity is O(mn×log(mn)), if there is only one stable matching. In the worst 
case, the time complexity may be up to O(n
m
). In the case the problem in Fig. 5, 
the computational time for a non-optimal stable matching solution was 0.4 second 
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on a PC with a dual 2.66GHz Intel CPU, while the computational time to achieve 
the optimal stable solution using the brute-force search was 24.5 minutes. 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 5: Optimal stable matching of 1,000 taxis and 1,000 passengers. (a) Distances to passenger 
of 1,000 taxis. (b) Statistic of number of taxis corresponding to travel distance. 
 
We note that this scheduling system only provides decision support for taxi 
drivers. Taxi drivers will not necessarily choose to collect an assigned passenger 
or use the assigned route. In practice, a taxi should not be assigned a passenger 
who is very far away because doing so leads to high, non-profitable mileage for 
the taxi driver and a possibly unacceptable waiting time for the passenger. 
Experiments are executed to compare the optimal stable solutions and the stable 
equilibria obtained by the previously described algorithm. We observed that, if we 
ignore the taxis that are assigned to distant passengers, and left them to be 
scheduled in the next time window, there was little difference between the optimal 
stable matching and the stable equilibrium obtained by our algorithm. In Figure 6, 
the taxis are sequenced according to their distances to assigned passengers. The 
red line indicates the optimal stable matching and the blue line a non-optimal 
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stable matching by our algorithm. It shows that the difference between the two 
matchings is minimal if we only consider 90% of the taxis that are assigned to 
passengers with distances ≤ 6km. The reason is that most taxis and passengers are 
located around the hot spots and the resulting short distances will be prioritized by 
the pairing method used to achieve a stable matching. The amount of computation 
could be greatly reduced if we do not need to find the optimal stable matching and 
these results imply that this is practical. 
 
 
Figure 6: A comparison between the optimal stable matching (red line) and a non-optimal stable 
matching (blue line). 
 
In order to investigate the influence of the number of taxis and the settings of the 
Poisson coefficients on the gap between the optimal stable matching and non-
optimal stable matchings, we performed a series of simulations on a simulated 
100km x 100km square area. The number of taxis is set to be equal to the number 
of passengers. Taxis and passengers are randomly distributed, according to a 
Poisson distribution. The optimal stable matching with different numbers of taxis 
(from 100 to 1,000) and different Poisson parameters λ (from 30 to 700) is 
computed. Figure 7 compares the average mileage of taxis on the optimal stable 
solution and a non-optimal stable solution, given a Poisson distribution with λ=70. 
Results for a revised optimal stable solution and a revised stable solution, which 
discards any taxis with an assigned mileage ≥ 50km, are also compared. We note 
that taxi drivers are not forced to pick up passengers, and the drivers become 
increasingly unlikely to do so as the mileage increases. Figure 8 shows the 
influence of different Poisson parameters for a fixed number of taxis (200). The 
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average mileage of matching is low when the distribution of taxis and passengers 
is centralized (the λ value is low). On the other hand, the average mileage is high 
when taxis and passengers are scattered. The difference between the revised 
solutions can be observed to be very limited in both figures. 
 
 
Figure 7: The effect of the number of taxis on the taxis’ average mileage.  
 
 
Figure 8: The influence of the Poisson coefficient on the taxis’ average mileage. 
 
 
Although taxis which are assigned to distant passengers would not necessarily 
pick up the passengers, the system could still be of use to these taxi drivers 
because it provides information about the distribution of passengers and other 
taxis. It can, therefore, help the taxi driver to choose where to go to next to find 
the next passenger.  
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For comparison, a FCFS strategy was developed where the passengers are 
allocated to taxis according to the time sequence of their requests, and each 
passenger is assigned to the nearest taxi which was available. FCFS is a ‘fair’ 
algorithm for passengers but it increases the average vacant mileage for taxi 
drivers compared with the optimal stable matching where taxi drivers cooperate to 
minimize the average vacant mileage. We show the comparison of the first come 
first serve (FCFS) strategy against the optimal stable matching in Figure 9.  
 
 
Figure 9: Comparison of the optimal stable matching with the result of FCFS strategy (the dashed 
line denotes the result of the FCFS strategy). 
4.2 Algorithms for dynamic scheduling 
In practice, taxi scheduling is a dynamic process and the time window for the 
request of a taxi service needs to be taken into consideration. We simulated a 
scheduling problem of 5,000 taxis and 50,000 passengers and present the results 
here. The location of taxis, passengers, and their destinations were within a square 
area. Travel times were calculated based upon the distance between the taxi and 
customer positions. Of course, taxi drivers are able to reject passengers (for 
example if a passenger was too far away) and would normally do so straight away 
in that case. The travel times for taxis (and the waiting times for serviced 
passengers) would then be lower but there would be un-serviced passengers. We 
assume for these experiments that taxi drivers do not reject passengers and 
therefore some passengers have relatively large waiting times. In these 
experiments, the requests for a taxi service from the passengers were randomly 
distributed in a period of 240 minutes, in addition to the random distributions of 
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their locations and destinations. The time of each request was determined using a 
Poisson distribution with λ=150. Three strategies are studied:  
1). First come first serve (FCFS). The nearest vacant taxi will be assigned 
immediately when the request for service is received. 
2). Strategy 1: The scheduling is performed every tw minutes, where tw is a 
parameter specifying a service window size. For these experiments, tw was set 
to 5 minutes. The passengers whose requests for service are received within 
the 5 minute window are all scheduled together using the algorithm described 
in Section 3. In practice, the value of tw can be adjusted depending on how 
busy the system is.  
3). Strategy 2: A combination of the FCFS strategy and strategy 1. A passenger 
will be immediately served according to the FCFS strategy if there is a vacant 
taxi within lw=10km distance (lw being another adjustable algorithm 
parameter), otherwise, strategy 1 will be adopted and a taxi will be allocated 
at the end of the current service window. 
 
The algorithm was coded in Visual C++ and experiments were run on a PC with 
dual 2.66GHz Intel CPU and 3.25GB RAM. The results of this simulation are 
shown in Table 1. With strategy 1, there is a delay between the passenger 
requesting service and the service being scheduled (of up to 5 minutes in the worst 
case). Although the average vacant mileage is decreased for the taxis compared 
with FCFS, the saving in passenger waiting time is counteracted by the scheduling 
delay. Strategy 2 is better than the other strategies in terms of its low waiting time 
of passengers.  
 
Table 1 Result of simulation 
Strategy 
Taxis Passengers 
Average mileage Average vacant mileage* 
Average waiting 
time** 
FCFS 48.28 9.70 18.5 
Strategy 1 52.01 6.45 19.1 
Strategy 2 51.79 6.75 14.3 
* Vacant mileage: travel distance for a taxi to reach the location of passengers. 
** Waiting time: the time interval between receiving of the request of service and arrival of taxi. 
 
The waiting times of passengers, mileages of taxis, and vacant mileages of taxis 
are shown in Figures 10-12 respectively.  
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Figure 10: Waiting times for passengers, (the passengers with waiting time more than 14 minutes 
are not shown). 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Mileages for the 5,000 taxis. 
 
 
Figure 12: Vacant mileages for the 5,000 taxis. 
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The results of the simulation show that the proposed scheduling algorithm 
benefits both taxi drivers and passengers. It increases valid mileages and 
decreases vacant mileages for taxis. Low vacant mileages lead to low waiting 
times for passengers.  
We note that the settings for the simulation; the Poisson distribution of 
taxis/passengers and the time window tw, have a significant influence on the 
results of the simulation. If the distribution of passengers is scattered, the vacant 
mileage of taxis will be high regardless of the scheduling strategy. 
The smaller the value of tw, the faster the service request will be served. In the 
extreme case, strategy 1 and strategy 2 becomes FCFS (First Come, First Served) when 
tw→0. However, the quality of solutions would then be low. On the other hand, taxis are 
more likely to be assigned to nearer passengers when the value of tw is higher, but the 
waiting time of passengers will be longer in this case. Strategy 2 is actually a tradeoff 
between FCFS and strategy 1. Strategy 2 will be FCFS if lw→∞ and it will be strategy 1 
if lw→0. 
5 Practical Implementation Issues 
The implementation of a live system to allocate taxis to passengers has to handle a 
number of practical issues which have not yet been discussed. Firstly, does the 
algorithm actually produce a stable matching in the case of equal taxi times? 
Secondly, can travel times be calculated accurately enough for use in the 
allocation algorithm? Thirdly, if taxis have identical travel times to a passenger 
then how does the algorithm determine which taxi to allocate? 
 
Figure 13: Example of a problem where two taxis have identical times to the passenger. 
 
For the first issue, consider the case in Figure 13, where taxis T1 and T2 are 
equidistant from passenger P1, and, without loss of generality, assume that taxi T1 
is allocated to passenger P1 and taxi T2 is allocated to passenger P2. If Taxi T2 has 
full awareness of the situation (that passenger P1 exists, is closer to taxi T2 than is 
passenger P2 and that taxi T2 is as close to passenger P1 as taxi T1 is, so that both 
T1 
 
1 1 
5 4 
T2 
 
P1 
 
P2 
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taxis have an equal chance of getting to P1 first) and passengers have no taxi 
preference other than taking the first taxi to appear, then taxi T2 could, in theory, 
race taxi T1 for passenger P1, and could, in some cases, increase its average payoff 
by doing so. A live system would have to resolve this issue, where taxis have 
similar travel times. Obvious solutions are to control information (so that a taxi 
driver does not have sufficient information to work out that there is a potential 
benefit from enforcing an assignment, or at least to ensure that the allocated taxi 
driver has the information first, to allow them to get to the passenger first) or to 
penalize in some way a taxi that races for a passenger (for example to lower the 
preference for that taxi in future). 
 
The answer to the second question, of whether taxi travel times can be calculated 
sufficiently accurately, is partly a question of the accuracy of the model which is 
used, but the question actually has significant similarities to the first question. As 
long as there is some way to give a preference to the allocated taxi, then some 
inaccuracies in travel times can be ignored as far as the stability of the schedule is 
concerned, since the allocated taxi would get there first even if the predicted travel 
time was not accurate. 
 
The third question, of how to allocate taxis to passengers, when the distances are 
identical, could be handled in a number of ways (here we assume that travel time 
is proportional to distance). Firstly, a priority index could be introduced for each 
taxi and passenger, which could be updated based upon their ‘discipline’ records, 
so that more reliable taxis or passengers were given preference. This could also be 
implemented to penalize taxis which ‘race’ for passengers which have been 
allocated to other taxis, as was discussed in the first question. A second method 
could consider the ‘search tree’ of possible allocations of taxis to passengers, 
‘looking ahead’ to see which allocation would be better overall. For example to 
consider the question, “If taxi T1 was allocated, how much would taxi T2 be 
penalized in terms of the extra distance to its allocated passenger, and vice versa 
for the penalty that taxi T2 would have?”. This would potentially ensure that the 
system is fair for the other taxi drivers. 
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6 Conclusion and future research 
Inspired by street hailing taxi services, we have proposed a novel, low cost system 
for the efficient allocation of independent taxis to passengers based on a game-
theoretic model. Relying on mobile phones with GPS functionality, the system 
collects information about the locations of passengers and the locations and 
statuses of taxis and provides decision support for both taxi drivers and passengers. 
The simulation results in this paper show that our system could greatly improve 
the efficiency of street hailing. 
 
The scheduling algorithm is based on a game theoretic model that considers the 
problem as a non-cooperative game between taxi drivers. An algorithm has been 
proposed which will discover a Nash equilibrium for this game, such that each 
taxi driver cannot find a better choice than their assigned passenger and route. The 
results of our simulation show that this algorithm is efficient in computing the 
stable matching of taxis and passengers and it only needs small amount of 
computations. Thus, it is suitable for online taxi scheduling. 
 
In addition to the time to pick up passengers, other factors may also influence the 
taxi drivers, for example, local knowledge of traffic conditions or preference for a 
specific area. Profitability and spatial equilibrium distribution of vacant taxis are 
discussed in (Yang et al. 2010a), where some taxi drivers have private information 
for their decision-making and this private information is not taken into 
consideration in the proposed scheduling system. In these cases the effectiveness 
of the system will be negatively influenced. It is worth taking these subjective 
factors into consideration, where possible, in implementing a practical system, 
although doing so will increase the complexity of the algorithm. Furthermore, 
there is always uncertainty in real world taxi scheduling. A passenger may change 
their plans or lose patience while waiting. Or a taxi may be late because of 
unexpected traffic congestion. The uncertainty on the proposed scheduling 
algorithm, and its robustness in a real world environment in the presence of 
uncertainty, will form part of our future research into this interesting and 
important problem. 
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